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Abstract. Grover’s search algorithm gives a quantum attack against
block ciphers by searching for a key that matches a small number of
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. This attack uses O(
√
N) calls to the cipher to
search a key space of size N . Previous work in the specific case of AES
derived the full gate cost by analyzing quantum circuits for the cipher,
but focused on minimizing the number of qubits.
In contrast, we study the cost of quantum key search attacks under a depth
restriction and introduce techniques that reduce the oracle depth, even if
it requires more qubits. As cases in point, we design quantum circuits
for the block ciphers AES and LowMC. Our circuits give a lower overall
attack cost in both the gate count and depth-times-width cost models.
In NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization process, security
categories are defined based on the concrete cost of quantum key search
against AES. We present new, lower cost estimates for each category,
so our work has immediate implications for the security assessment of
post-quantum cryptography.
As part of this work, we release Q# implementations of the full Grover
oracle for AES-128, -192, -256 and for the three LowMC instantiations
used in Picnic, including unit tests and code to reproduce our quantum
resource estimates. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first two
such full implementations and automatic resource estimations.
Keywords: Quantum cryptanalysis, Grover’s algorithm, AES, LowMC,
post-quantum cryptography, Q# implementation.
1 Introduction
The prospect of a large-scale, cryptographically relevant quantum computer
has prompted increased scrutiny of the post-quantum security of cryptographic
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primitives. Shor’s algorithm for factoring and computing discrete logarithms
introduced in [45] and [46] will completely break public-key schemes such as RSA,
ECDSA and ECDH. But symmetric schemes like block ciphers and hash functions
are widely considered post-quantum secure. The only caveat thus far is a security
reduction due to key search or pre-image attacks with Grover’s algorithm [22].
As Grover’s algorithm only provides at most a square root speedup, the rule of
thumb is to simply double the cipher’s key size to make it post-quantum secure.
Such conventional wisdom reflects the asymptotic behavior and only gives a
rough idea of the security penalties that quantum computers inflict on symmetric
primitives. In particular, the cost of evaluating the Grover oracle is often ignored.
In their call for proposals to the standardization of post-quantum cryptogra-
phy [37], the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) proposes
security categories for post-quantum public-key schemes such as key encapsu-
lation and digital signatures. Categories are defined by the cost of quantum
algorithms for exhaustive key search on the block cipher AES and collision search
for the hash function SHA-3, and measure the attack cost in the number of
quantum gates. Because the gate count of Grover’s algorithm increases with
parallelization, they impose a total upper bound on the depth of a quantum
circuit, called MAXDEPTH, and account for this in the gate counts. An algorithm
meets the requirements of a specific security category if the best known attack
uses more resources (gates) than are needed to solve the reference problem. Hence,
a concrete and meaningful definition of these security categories depends on
precise resource estimates of the Grover oracle for key search on AES. Security
categories 1, 3 and 5 correspond to key recovery against AES-128, AES-192 and
AES-256, respectively. The NIST proposal derives gate cost estimates from the
concrete, gate-level descriptions of the AES oracle by Grassl et al. [21]. Grassl et
al. aim to minimize the circuit width, i.e. the number of qubits needed.
Prior work. Since the publication of [21], other works have studied quantum
circuits for AES, the AES Grover oracle and its use in Grover’s algorithm.
Almazrooie et al. [3] improve the quantum circuit for AES-128. As in [21], the
focus is on minimizing the number of qubits. The improvements are a slight
reduction in the total number of Toffoli gates and the number of qubits by using
a wider binary field inversion circuit that saves one multiplication. Kim et al. [29]
discuss time-space trade-offs for key search on block ciphers in general and use
AES as an example. They discuss NIST’s MAXDEPTH parameter and hence study
parallelization strategies for Grover’s algorithm to address the depth constraint.
They take the Toffoli gate depth as the relevant metric for the MAXDEPTH bound
arguing that it is a conservative approximation.
Recently, independent and concurrent to parts of this work, Langenberg et
al. [31] developed quantum circuits for AES that demonstrate significant improve-
ments over those presented in [21] and [3]. The main source of optimization is
a different S-box design derived from work by Boyar and Peralta in [10] and
[11], which greatly reduces the number of Toffoli gates in the S-box as well as its
Toffoli depth. Another improvement is that fewer auxiliary qubits are required
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for the AES key expansion. Again, this work aligns with the objectives in [21] to
keep the number of qubits small.
Bonnetain et al. [9] study the post-quantum security of AES within a new
framework for classical and quantum structured search. The work cites [21] for
deducing concrete gate counts for reduced-round attacks.
Our contributions. We present implementations of the full Grover oracle for
key search on AES and LowMC in Q# [49], including full implementations of the
block ciphers themselves. In contrast to previous work [21], [3] and [31], having a
concrete implementation allows us to get more precise, flexible and automatic
estimates of the resources required to compute these operations. It also allows us
to unit test our circuits, to make sure that the implementations are correct.
The source code is publicly available5 under a free license. We hope that it can
serve as a useful starting point for cryptanalytic work to assess the post-quantum
security of other schemes.
We review the literature on the parallelization of Grover’s algorithm ([13],
[55], [23], [29]) to explore the cost of attacking AES and LowMC in the presence
of a bound on the total depth, such as MAXDEPTH proposed by NIST. We conclude
that using parallelization by dividing the search space is advantageous. We also
give a rigorous justification for the number of plaintext-ciphertext blocks needed
in Grover’s oracle in the context of parallelization. Smaller values than those
proposed by Grassl et al. [21] are sufficient, as is also pointed out in [31].
Our quantum circuit optimization approach differs from those in the previous
literature [21], [3] and [31] in that our implementations do not aim for the lowest
possible number of qubits. Instead, we designed them to minimize the gate-count
and depth-times-width cost metrics for quantum circuits under a depth constraint.
The gate-count metric is relevant for defining the NIST security categories and the
depth-times-width cost metric is a more realistic measure of quantum resources
when quantum error correction is deployed. Favoring lower depth at the cost of a
slightly larger width in the oracle circuit leads to costs that are smaller in both
metrics than for the circuits presented in [21], [3] and [31]. Grover’s algorithm
does not parallelize well, meaning that minimizing depth rather than width is
crucial to make the most out of the available depth.
To the best of our knowledge, our work results in the most shallow quantum
circuit of AES so far, and the first ever for LowMC. We chose to also implement
LowMC as an example of a quantum circuit for another block cipher. It is
used in the Picnic signature scheme ([14], [56]), a round-2 candidate in the NIST
standardization process. Thus, our implementation can contribute to more precise
cost estimates for attacks on Picnic and its post-quantum security assessment.
We present our results for quantum key search on AES in the context of the
NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process and derive new and
lower cost estimates for the definition of the NIST security strength categories.
We see a consistent gate cost reduction between 11 and 13 bits, making it easier
for submitters to claim a certain quantum security category.
5 https://github.com/microsoft/grover-blocks
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2 Finding a block cipher key with Grover’s algorithm
Given plaintext-ciphertext pairs created by encrypting a small number of messages
under a block cipher, Grover’s quantum search algorithm [22] can be used to
find the secret key [54]. This section provides some preliminaries on Grover’s
algorithm, how it can be applied to the key search problem and how it parallelizes
under depth constraints.
2.1 Grover’s algorithm
Grover’s algorithm [22] searches through a space of N elements; for simplicity, we
restrict to N = 2k right away and label elements by their indices in {0, 1}k. The
algorithm works with a superposition |ψ〉 = 2−k/2∑x∈{0,1}k |x〉 of all indices,
held in a register of k qubits. It makes use of an operator Uf for evaluating a
Boolean function f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1} that marks solutions to the search problem,
i.e. f(x) = 1 if and only if the element corresponding to x is a solution. When
applying the Grover oracle Uf to a state |x〉 |y〉 for a single qubit |y〉, it acts
as |x〉 |y〉 7→ |x〉 |y ⊕ f(x)〉 in the computational basis. When |y〉 is in the state
|ϕ〉 = (|0〉− |1〉)/√2, then this action can be written as |x〉 |ϕ〉 7→ (−1)f(x) |x〉 |ϕ〉.
This means that the oracle applies a phase shift to exactly the solution indices.
The algorithm first prepares the state |ψ〉 |ϕ〉 with |ψ〉 and |ϕ〉 as above. It
then repeatedly applies the so-called Grover iteration G = (2 |ψ〉〈ψ| − I)Uf , an
operator that consists of the oracle Uf followed by the operator 2 |ψ〉〈ψ| − I,
which can be viewed as an inversion about the mean amplitude. Each iteration
can be visualized as a rotation of the state vector in the plane spanned by two
orthogonal vectors: the superposition of all indices corresponding to solutions and
non-solutions, respectively. The operator G rotates the vector by a constant angle
towards the superposition of solution indices. Let 1 ≤M ≤ N be the number of
solutions and let 0 < θ ≤ pi/2 such that sin2(θ) = M/N . Note that if M  N ,
then sin(θ) is very small and θ ≈ sin(θ) = √M/N .
When measuring the first k qubits after j > 0 iterations of G, the success
probability p(j) for obtaining one of the solutions is p(j) = sin2((2j + 1)θ) [13],
which is close to 1 for j ≈ pi4θ . Hence, after
⌊
pi
4
√
N
M
⌋
iterations, measurement
yields a solution with overwhelming probability of at least 1− MN .
Grover’s algorithm is optimal in the sense that any quantum search algorithm
needs at least Ω(
√
N) oracle queries to solve the problem [13]. In [55], Zalka
shows that for any number of oracle queries, Grover’s algorithm gives the largest
probability to find a solution.
2.2 Key search for a block cipher
Let C be a block cipher with block length n and key length k; for a key K ∈ {0, 1}k
denote by CK(m) ∈ {0, 1}n the encryption of message block m ∈ {0, 1}n under
the key K. Given r plaintext-ciphertext pairs (mi, ci) with ci = CK(mi), we
aim to apply Grover’s algorithm to find the unknown key K [54]. The Boolean
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function f for the Grover oracle takes a key K as input, and is defined as f(K) = 1
if CK(mi) = ci for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and f(K) = 0 otherwise.
Possibly, there exist other keys than K that encrypt the known plaintexts to
the same ciphertexts. We call such keys spurious keys. If their number is known
to be, say M − 1, the M -solution version of Grover’s algorithm has the same
probability of measuring each spurious key as measuring the correct K.
Spurious keys. We assume that under a fixed key K, the map {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n,m 7→ CK(m) is a pseudo-random permutation; and under a fixed message
block m, the map {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n,K 7→ CK(m) is a pseudo-random function.
Now let K be the correct key, i.e. the one used for the encryption. It follows that
for a single message block of length n, PrK 6=K′ (CK(m) = CK′(m)) = 2−n.
This probability becomes smaller when the equality condition is extended to
multiple blocks. Given r distinct messages m1, . . . ,mr ∈ {0, 1}n, we have
Pr
K 6=K′
((CK(m1), . . . , CK(mr)) = (CK′(m1), . . . , CK′(mr))) =
r−1∏
i=0
1
2n − i , (1)
which is ≈ 2−rn for r2  2n. Since the number of keys different from K is
2k − 1, we expect the number of spurious keys for an r-block message to be
≈ (2k − 1)2−rn. Choosing r such that this quantity is very small ensures with
high probability that there is a unique key and we can parameterize Grover’s
algorithm for a single solution.
Remark 1. Grassl et al. [21, §3.1] work with a similar argument. They take the
probability over pairs (K ′,K ′′) of keys with K ′ 6= K ′′. Since there are 22k − 2k
such pairs, they conclude that about (22k − 2k)2−rn satisfy the above condition
that the ciphertexts coincide on all r blocks. But this also counts pairs of keys for
which the ciphertexts match each other, but do not match the images under the
correct K. Thus, using the number of pairs overestimates the number of spurious
keys and hence the number r of message blocks needed to ensure a unique key.
Based on the above heuristic assumptions, one can determine the probability
for a specific number of spurious keys. Let X be the random variable whose
value is the number of spurious keys for a given set of r message blocks and
a given key K. Then, X is distributed according to a binomial distribution:
Pr(X = t) =
(
2k−1
t
)
pt(1− p)2k−1−t, where p = 2−rn. We use the Poisson limit
theorem to conclude that this is approximately a Poisson distribution with
Pr(X = t) ≈ e− 2
k−1
2rn
(2k − 1)t(2−rn)t
t!
≈ e−2k−rn 2
t(k−rn)
t!
. (2)
The probability that K is the unique key consistent with the r plaintext-
ciphertext pairs is Pr(X = 0) ≈ e−2k−rn . Thus we can choose r such that rn is
slightly larger than k; rn = k + 10 gives Pr(X = 0) ≈ 0.999. In a block cipher
where k = b · n is a multiple of n, taking r = b+ 1 will give the unique key K
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with probability at least 1− 2−n, which is negligibly close to 1 for typical block
sizes. If rn < k, then K is almost certainly not unique. Even rn = k − 3 gives
less than a 1% chance of a unique key. Hence, r must be at least dk/ne.
The case k = rn, when the total message length is equal to the key length,
remains interesting if one aims to minimize the number of qubits. The probability
for a unique K is Pr(X = 0) ≈ 1/e ≈ 0.3679, and the probability of exactly
one spurious key is the same. Kim et al. [29, Equation (7)] describe the success
probability after a certain number of Grover iterations when the number of
spurious keys is unknown. The optimal number of iterations gives a maximum
success probability of 0.556, making it likely that the first attempt will not find
the correct key and one must repeat the algorithm.
Depth constraints for cryptanalysis. In this work, we assume that any
quantum adversary is bounded by a constraint on its total depth for running
a quantum circuit. In its call for proposals to the post-quantum cryptography
standardization effort [37], NIST introduces the parameter MAXDEPTH as such a
bound and suggests that reasonable values are between 240 and 296. Whenever an
algorithm’s overall depth exceeds this bound, parallelization becomes necessary.
We do assume that MAXDEPTH constitutes a hard upper bound on the total depth
of a quantum attack, including possible repetitions of a Grover instance.
In general, an attacker can be assumed to have a finite amount of resources, in
particular a finite time for an attack. This is equivalent to postulating an upper
bound on the total depth of a quantum circuit as suggested by NIST. Unlike in
the classical case, the required parallelization increases the gate cost for Grover’s
algorithm, which makes it important to study attacks with bounded depth.
We consider it reasonable to expect that the overall attack strategy is guar-
anteed to return a solution with high probability close to 1 within the given
depth bound. E.g., a success probability of 1/2 for a Grover instance to find the
correct key requires multiple runs to increase the overall probability closer to 1.
These runs, either sequentially or in parallel, need to be taken into account for
determining the overall cost and must respect the depth limit. While this setting
is our main focus, it can be adequate to allow and cost a quantum algorithm
with a success probability noticeably smaller than 1. Where not given in this
paper, the corresponding analysis can be derived in a straightforward manner.
2.3 Parallelization
There are different ways to parallelize Grover’s algorithm. Kim et al. [29] describe
two, which they denote as inner and outer parallelization. Outer parallelization
runs multiple instances of the full algorithm in parallel. Only one instance must
succeed, allowing us to reduce the necessary success probability, and hence number
of iterations, for all. Inner parallelization divides the search space into disjoint
subsets and assigns each subset to a parallel machine. Each machine’s search
space is smaller, so the number of necessary iterations shrinks.
Zalka [55] concludes that in both cases, one only obtains a factor
√
S gain in
the number of Grover iterations when working with S parallel Grover oracles, and
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that this is asymptotically optimal. Compared to many classical algorithms, this
is an inefficient parallelization, since we must increase the width by a factor of S
to reduce the depth by a factor of
√
S. Both methods avoid any communication,
quantum or classical, during the Grover iterations. They require communication
at the beginning, to distribute the plaintext-ciphertext pairs to each machine
and to delegate the search space for inner parallelization, and communication at
the end to collect the measured keys and decide which one, if any, is the true key.
The next section discusses why our setting favours inner parallelization.
Advantages of inner parallelization. Consider S parallel machines that
we run for j iterations, using the notation of §2.1, and a unique key. For a
single machine, the success probability is p(j) = sin2 ((2j + 1)θ). Using outer
parallelization, the probability that at least one machine recovers the correct key is
pS(j) = 1−(1−p(j))S . We hope to gain a factor
√
S in the number of iterations, so
instead of iterating
⌊
pi
4θ
⌋
times, we run each machine for jS =
⌊
pi
4θ
√
S
⌋
iterations.
Considering some small values of S, we get S = 1 : p1(j1) ≈ 1, S = 2 :
p2(j2) ≈ 0.961 and S = 3 : p3(j3) ≈ 0.945. As S gets larger, we use a series
expansion to find that
pS(jS) ≈ 1−
(
1− pi
2
4S
+O
(
1
S2
))S
S→∞−−−−→ 1− e−pi
2
4 ≈ 0.915. (3)
This means that by simply increasing S, it is not possible to gain a factor
√
S
in the number of iterations if one aims for a success probability close to 1. In
contrast, with inner parallelization, the correct key lies in the search space of
exactly one machine. With jS iterations, this machine has near certainty of
measuring the correct key, while other machines are guaranteed not to measure
the correct key. Overall, we have near-certainty of finding the correct key. Inner
parallelization thus achieves a higher success probability with the same number
S of parallel instances and the same number of iterations.
Another advantage of inner parallelization is that dividing the search space
separates any spurious keys into different subsets and reduces the search problem
to finding a unique key. This allows us to reduce the number r of message
blocks in the Grover oracle and was already observed by Kim et al. [29] in the
context of measure-and-repeat methods. In fact, the correct key lies in exactly
one subset of the search space. If the spurious keys fall into different subsets, the
respective machines measure spurious keys, which can be discarded classically
after measurement with access to the appropriate number of plaintext-ciphertext
pairs. The only relevant question is whether there is a spurious key in the
correct key’s subset of size 2k/S. The probability for this is SKP(k, n, r, S) =∑∞
t=1 Pr(X = t) ≈ 1 − e−
2k−rn
S , using Equation (2) with 2k replaced by 2k/S.
If k = rn, this probability is roughly 1/S when S gets larger. In general, high
parallelization makes spurious keys irrelevant, and the Grover oracle can simply
use the smallest r such that SKP(k, n, r, S) is less than a desired bound.
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3 Quantum circuit design
Quantum computation is usually described in the quantum circuit model. This
section describes our interpretation of quantum circuits, methods and criteria for
quantum circuit design, and cost models to estimate quantum resources.
3.1 Assumptions about the fault-tolerant gate set and architecture
The quantum circuits we are concerned with in this paper operate on qubits. They
are composed of so-called Clifford+T gates, which form a commonly used universal
fault-tolerant gate set exposed by several families of quantum error-correcting
codes. The primitive gates consist of single-qubit Clifford gates, controlled-NOT
(CNOT) gates, T gates, and measurements. We make the standard assumption of
full parallelism, meaning that a quantum circuit can apply any number of gates
simultaneously so long as these gates act on disjoint sets of qubits [8,23].
All quantum circuits for AES and LowMC described in this paper were
designed, tested, and costed in the Q# programming language [49], which supports
all assumptions discussed here. We adopt the computational model presented
in [25]. The Q# compiler allows us to compute circuit depth automatically by
moving gates around through a circuit if the qubits it acts on were previously
idle. In particular, this means that the depth of two circuits applied in series may
be less than the sum of the individual depths of each circuit. The Q# language
allows the circuit to allocate auxiliary qubits as needed, which adds new qubits
initialized to |0〉. If an auxiliary qubit is returned to the state |0〉 after it has been
operated on, the circuit can release it. Such a qubit is no longer entangled with
the state used for computation and the circuit can now maintain or measure it.
Grover’s algorithm is a far-future quantum algorithm, making it difficult
to decide on the right cost for each gate. Previous work assumed that T gates
constitute the main cost ([21], [3], [31]). They are exceptionally expensive for a
surface code [19]; however, for a future error-correcting code, T gates may be
transversal and cheap while a different gate may be expensive. Thus, we present
costs for both counting T gates only, and costing all gates equally. For most of
the circuits, these concerns do not change the optimal design.
We ignore all concerns of layout and communication costs for the Grover
oracle circuit. Though making this assumption is unrealistic for a surface code,
where qubits can only interact with neighboring ones, other codes may not have
these issues. A single oracle circuit uses relatively few logical qubits (< 220),
so these costs are unlikely to dominate. This allows us to compare our work
with previous proposals, which also ignore these costs. This also implies that
uncontrolled swaps are free, since the classical controller can simply track such
swaps and rearrange where it applies subsequent gates.
While previous work on quantum circuits for AES such as [21], [3] and [31]
mainly uses Toffoli gates, we use AND gates instead. A quantum AND gate
has the same functionality as a Toffoli gate, except the target qubit is assumed
to be in the state |0〉, rather than an arbitrary state. We use a combination6
6 We thank Mathias Soeken for providing the implementation of the AND gate circuit.
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of Selinger’s [44] and Jones’ [28] circuits to express the AND gate in terms of
Clifford and T gates. This circuit uses 4 T gates and 11 Clifford gates in T -depth
1 and total depth 8. It uses one auxiliary qubit which it immediately releases,
while its adjoint circuit is slightly smaller.
3.2 Automated resource estimation and unit tests
One incentive for producing full implementations of the Grover oracle and its
components is to obtain precise resource estimates automatically and directly from
the circuit descriptions. Another incentive is to test the circuits for correctness
and to compare results on classical inputs against existing classical software
implementations that are known (or believed) to be correct. Yet quantum circuits
are in general not testable, since they rely on hardware yet to be constructed. To
partially address this issue, the Q# compiler can classically simulate a subset of
quantum circuits, enabling partial test coverage. We thus designed our circuits
such that this tool can fully classically simulate them, by using X, CNOT,
CCNOT, SWAP, and AND gates only, together with measurements (denoted
throughout as M “gates”). This approach limits the design space since we cannot
use true quantum methods within the oracle. Yet, it is worthwhile to implement
components that are testable and can be fully simulated to increase confidence
in the validity of resource estimates deduced from such implementations.
As part of the development process, we first implemented AES (resp. LowMC)
in Python3, and tested the resulting code against the AES implementation
in PyCryptodome 3.8.2 [39] (resp. the C++ reference implementation in [33]).
Then, we proceeded to write our Q# implementations (running on the Dotnet
Core version 2.1.507, using the Microsoft Quantum Development Kit version
0.7.1905.3109), and tested these against our Python3 implementations, by making
use of the IQ# interface (see [36],[35]. For the Q# simulator to run, we are required
to use the Microsoft QDK standard library’s Toffoli gate for evaluating both
Toffoli and AND gates, which results in deeper than necessary circuits. We also
have to explicitly SWAP values across wires, which costs 3 CNOT gates, rather
than simply keeping track of the necessary free rewiring. Hence, to mitigate these
effects, our functions admit a Boolean flag indicating whether the code is being
run as part of a unit test by the simulator, or as part of a cost estimate. In the
latter case, Toffoli and AND gate designs are automatically replaced by shallower
ones, and SWAP instructions are disregarded as free (after manually checking
that this does not allow for incompatible circuit optimizations). All numbers
reporting the total width of a circuit include the initial number of qubits plus
the maximal number of temporarily allocated auxiliary qubits within the Q#
function. For numbers describing the total depth, all gates such as Clifford gates,
CNOT and T gates as well as measurements are assigned a depth of 1.
The AND and Toffoli gate designs we chose use measurements, hence CNOT, 1-
qubit Clifford, measurement and depth counts are probabilistic. The Q# simulator
does not currently support PRNG seeding for de-randomizing the measurements,7
7 https://github.com/microsoft/qsharp-runtime/issues/30, visited 2019-08-24.
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which means that estimating differently sized circuits with the same or similar
depth (or re-estimating the same circuit multiple times) may result in slightly
different numbers. We also note that the compiler is currently unable to optimize
a given circuit by, e.g., searching through small circuit variations that may result
in functionally the same operation at a smaller cost (say by allowing better use
of the circuit area).
3.3 Reversible circuits for linear maps
Linear maps f : Fn2 → Fm2 for varying dimensions n and m are essential building
blocks of AES and LowMC. In general, such a map f , expressed as multiplication
by a constant matrix Mf ∈ Fm×n2 , can be implemented as a reversible circuit
on n input wires and m additional output wires (initialized to |0〉), by using an
adequate sequence of CNOT gates: if the (i, j)-th coefficient of Mf is 1, we set a
CNOT gate targeting the i-th output wire, controlled on the j-th input wire.
Yet, if a linear map g : Fn2 → Fn2 is invertible, one can reversibly compute it in-
place on the input wires via a PLU decomposition ofMg,Mg = P ·L·U [51, Lecture
21]. The lower- and upper-triangular components L and U of the decomposition
can be implemented as described above by using the appropriate CNOT gates,
while the final permutation P does not require any quantum gates and instead, is
realized by appropriately keeping track of the necessary rewiring. While rewiring
is not easily supported in Q#, the same effect can be obtained by defining a
custom REWIRE operation that computes an in-place swap of any two wires when
testing an implementation, and that can be disabled when costing it. We note
that such decompositions are not generally unique, but it is not clear whether
sparser decompositions can be consistently obtained with any particular technique.
For our implementations, we adopt the PLU decomposition algorithm from [51,
Algorithm 21.1], as implemented in SageMath 8.1 [48].
3.4 Cost metrics for quantum circuits
For a meaningful cost analysis, we assume that an adversary has fixed constraints
on its total available resources, and a specific cost metric they wish to minimize.
Most importantly, we assume a total depth limit Dmax as explained in §2.2.
In this paper, we use the two cost metrics that are considered by Jaques and
Schanck in [25]. The first is the total number of gates, the G-cost. It assumes
non-volatile (“passive”) quantum memory, and therefore models circuits that
incur some cost with every gate, but no cost is incurred in time units during
which a qubit is not operated on.
The second cost metric is the product of circuit depth and width, the DW -cost.
This is a more realistic cost model when quantum error correction is necessary. It
assumes a volatile (“active”) quantum memory, which incurs some cost to correct
errors on every qubit in each time step, i.e. each layer of the total circuit depth.
In this cost model, a released auxiliary qubit would not require error correction,
and the cost to correct it could be omitted. But we assume an efficient strategy
for qubit allocation that avoids long idle periods for released qubits and thus
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choose to ignore this subtlety. Instead, we simply cost the maximum width at any
point in the oracle, times its total depth. For both cost metrics, we can choose to
count only T -gates towards gate count and depth, or count all gates equally.
The cost of Grover’s algorithm. As in §2.1, let the search space have size N =
2k. Suppose we use an oracle G such that a single Grover iteration costs GG gates,
has depth GD, and uses GW qubits. Let S = 2
s be the number of parallel machines
that are used with the inner parallelization method by dividing the search space in
S disjoint parts (see §2.3). In order to achieve a certain success probability p, the re-
quired number of iterations can be deduced from p ≤ sin2((2j + 1)θ) which yields
jp =
⌈
(arcsin
(√
p
)
/θ − 1)/2⌉ ≈ arcsin(√p)/2 ·√N/S. Let cp = arcsin(√p)/2,
then the total depth of a jp-fold Grover iteration is
D = jpGD ≈ cp
√
N/S · GD = cp2
k−s
2 GD cycles. (4)
Note that for p ≈ 1 we have cp ≈ c1 = pi4 . Each machine uses jpGG ≈ cp
√
N/S ·
GG = cp2
k−s
2 GG gates, i.e. the total G-cost over all S machines is
G = S · jpGG ≈ cp
√
N · S · GG = cp2
k+s
2 GG gates. (5)
Finally, the total width is W = S ·GW = 2sGW qubits, which leads to a DW -cost
DW ≈ cp
√
N · S · GDGW = cp2
k+s
2 GDGW qubit-cycles. (6)
These cost expressions show that minimizing the number S = 2s of parallel
machines minimizes both G-cost and DW -cost. Thus, under fixed limits on depth,
width, and the number of gates, an adversary’s best course of action is to use
the entire depth budget and parallelize as little as possible. Under this premise,
the depth limit fully determines the optimal attack strategy for a given Grover
oracle. Limits on width or the number of gates simply become binary feasibility
criteria and are either too tight and the adversary cannot finish the attack, or
one of the limits is loose. If one resource limit is loose, we may be able to modify
the oracle to use this resource to reduce depth, lowering the overall cost.
Optimizing the oracle under a depth limit. Grover’s full algorithm par-
allelizes so badly that it is generally preferable to parallelize within the oracle
circuit. Reducing its depth allows more iterations within the depth limit, thus
reducing the necessary parallelization.
Let Dmax be a fixed depth limit. Given the depth GD of the oracle, we are
able to run jmax = bDmax/GDc Grover iterations of the oracle G. For a target
success probability p, we obtain the number S of parallel instances to achieve
this probability in the instance whose key space partition contains the key from
p ≤ sin2((2jmax + 1)
√
S/N) as
S =
⌈
N · arcsin2(√p)
(2 · bDmax/GDc+ 1)2
⌉
≈ c2p2k
G2D
D2max
. (7)
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Using this in Equation (5) gives a total gate count of
G = c2p2
kGDGG
Dmax
gates. (8)
It follows that for two oracle circuits G and F, the total G-cost is lower for G if
and only if GDGG < FDFG. That is, we wish to minimize the product GDGG.
Similarly, the total DW -cost under the depth constraint is
DW = c2p2
kG
2
DGW
Dmax
qubit-cycles. (9)
Here, we wish to minimize G2DGW of the oracle circuit to minimize total DW -cost.
4 A quantum circuit for AES
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [15,16] is a block cipher standard-
ized by NIST in 2001. Using the notation from [15], AES is composed of an
S-box, a Round function (with subroutines ByteSub, ShiftRow, MixColumn,
AddRoundKey; with the last round slightly differing from the others), and a
KeyExpansion function (with subroutines SubByte, RotByte). Three different
instances of AES have been standardized, for key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits.
Grassl et al. [21] describe their quantum circuit implementation of the S-box and
other components, resulting in a full description of all three instances of AES
(but no testable code has been released). Grassl et al. take care to reduce the
number of auxiliary qubits required, i.e. reducing the circuit width as much as
possible. The recent improvements by Langenberg et al. [31] build on the work
by Grassl et al. with similar objectives.
In this section, we describe our implementation of AES in the quantum
programming language Q# [49]. Some of the components are taken from the
description in [21], while others are implemented independently, or ported from
other sources. We take the circuit description from [21] as the basis for our work
and compare to the results in [31]. In general, we aim at reducing the depth of
the AES circuit, while limitations on width are less important. Width restrictions
are not explicitly considered by the NIST call for proposals [37, § 4.A.5].
The internal state of AES contains 128 bits, arranged in four 32-bit (or 4-byte)
words. In the rest of this section, when referring to a ‘word’, we intend a 4-byte
word. In all tables below, we denote by #CNOT, the number of CNOT gates, by
#1qCliff the number of 1-qubit Clifford gates, by #T the number of T gates, by
#M the number of measurement operations and by width the number of qubits.
S-box, ByteSub and SubByte. The AES S-box is a transformation that
inverts the input as an element of F256, and maps 0 to 0. The S-box is the only
source of T gates in a quantum circuit of AES. On classical hardware, it can be
implemented easily using a lookup-table. Yet, on a quantum computer, this is
not efficient (see [5], [32] and [20]). Alternatively, the inversion can be computed
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either by using some variant of Euclid’s algorithm (taking care of the special case
of 0), or by applying Lagrange’s theorem and raising the input to the (|F×256|−1)th
power (i.e. the 254th power), which incidentally also takes care of the 0 input.
Grassl et al. [21] suggest an Itoh-Tsujii inversion algorithm [24], following [4],
and compute all required multiplications over F2[x]/(x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1). This
idea had already been extensively explored in the vast8 literature on hardware
design for AES, and requires a different construction of F256 to be most effective.
Following this lead, we port the S-box circuit by Boyar and Peralta from [11] to
Q#. The specified linear program combining AND and XOR operations can be
easily expressed as a sequence of equivalent CNOT and AND operations (we use
cheaper T -depth-1 AND gates [44,28] instead of T -depth-1 CCNOT gates [44]).
Cost estimates for the AES S-box are in Table 1. We compare to our own Q#
implementation of the S-box circuits from [21] and [31]. ByteSub is a state-wide
parallel application of the S-box, requiring new output auxiliary qubits to store
the result, while SubByte is a similar word-wide application of the S-box.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -depth full depth width
[21] S-box 8683 1028 3584 0 217 1692 44
[10] S-box 818 264 164 41 35 497 41
[11] S-box 654 184 136 34 6 101 137
Table 1: Comparison of our reconstruction of the original [21] S-box circuit with
the one from [10] as used in [31] and the one in this work based on [11]. In our
implementation of [10] from [31], we replace CCNOT gates with AND gates to
allow a fairer comparison.
Remark 2. Langenberg et al. [31] independently introduced a new AES quantum
circuit design using the S-box circuit proposed in [10]. They also present a
ProjectQ [47] implementation of the S-box, albeit without unit tests. We ported
their source code to Q#, tested and costed it. For a fairer comparison, we
replaced their CCNOT gates with the AND gate design that our circuits use.
Cost estimates can be found in Table 1. Overall, the [11] S-box leads to a more
cost effective circuit for our purposes in both the G-cost and DW -cost metrics,
and hence we did not proceed further in our analysis of costs using the [10]
design. Note that the results obtained here differ from the ones presented in [31,
§3.2]. This is due to the difference in counting gates and depth. While [31] counts
Toffoli gates, the Q# resource estimator costs at a lower level of T gates and also
counts all gates needed to implement a Toffoli gate.
ShiftRow and RotByte. ShiftRow is a permutation on the full 128-bit AES
state, happening across its four words [15, §4.2.2]. As a permutation of qubits, it
can be entirely encoded as rewiring. As in [21], we consider rewiring as free and
8 E.g. see [42], [43], [10], [12], [27], [38], [52], [41], [40], [53].
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do not include it in our cost estimates. Similarly, RotByte is a circular left shift
of a word by 8 bits, and can be implemented by appropriate rewiring as well.
MixColumn. The operation MixColumn interprets each word in the state as a
polynomial in F256[x]/(x4 + 1). Each word is multiplied by a fixed polynomial
c(x) [15, § 4.2.3]. Since the latter is coprime to x4 + 1, this operation can be
seen as an invertible linear transformation, and hence can be implemented in
place by a PLU decomposition of a matrix in F32×322 . To simplify this tedious
operation, we use SageMath [48] code that performs the PLU decomposition, and
outputs equivalent Q# code. Note that [21] describes the same technique, while
achieving a significantly smaller design than the one we obtain (ref. Table 2),
but we were not able to reproduce these results. However, highly optimized,
shallower circuits have been proposed in the hardware design literature such
as [26], [30], [7], [18], [50]. Hence, we chose to use one of those and experiment
with a recent design by Maximov [34]. Both circuits are costed independently in
Table 2. Maximov’s circuit has a much lower depth, but it only reduces the total
depth, does not reduce the T -depth (which is already 0) and comes at the cost
of an increased width. Our experiments show that without a depth restriction,
it seems advantageous to use the in-place version to minimize both G-cost and
DW -cost metrics, while for a depth restricted setting, Maximov’s circuit seems
better due to the square in the depth term in Equation (9).
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -depth full depth width
In-place MixColumn 1108 0 0 0 0 111 128
[34] MixColumn 1248 0 0 0 0 22 318
Table 2: Comparison of an in-place implementation of MixColumn (via PLU
decomposition) versus the recent shallow out-of-place design in [34].
AddRoundKey. AddRoundKey performs a bitwise XOR of a round key to the
internal AES state and can be realized with a parallel application of 128 CNOT
gates, controlled on the round key qubits and targeted on the state qubits. Grassl
et al. [21] and Langenberg et al. [31] use the same approach.
KeyExpansion. Key expansion is one of the two sources of T gates in the
design of AES, and hence might have a strong impact on the overall efficiency of
the circuit. A simple implementation of KeyExpansion would allocate enough
auxiliary qubits to store the full expanded key, including all round keys. This is
easy to implement with relatively low depth, but uses more qubits than necessary.
The authors of [21] amortize this width cost by caching only those key bytes that
require S-box evaluations. Instead, we minimize width by not requiring auxiliary
qubits at all. At the same time, we reduce the depth in comparison with the
naive key expansion using auxiliary qubits for all key bits as described above.
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Let |k〉0 denote the AES key consisting of Nk ∈ {4, 6, 8} key words and |k〉i
the i-th set of Nk consecutive round key words. The first such block |k〉1 can
be computed in-place as shown in the appropriately sized circuit in Figure 1.
This circuit produces the i-th set of Nk key words from the (i− 1)-th set. Note
that for AES-128, these sets correspond to the actual round keys as the key
size is equal to the block size, for AES-192 and AES-256, each round key set
generates more words than needed in a single round key. The full operation
mapping |k〉i−1 7→ |k〉i is denoted by KE. As for the two larger key sizes, each
round only needs parts of these sets of round key words, we specify KElj to
denote the part of the operation KE that produces the words j . . . l of the new
set, disregarding other words. KElj can be used as part of the round strategy
described below to only compute as many words of the round key as necessary,
resulting in an overall narrower and shallower circuit.
|k0〉i−1
|k1〉i−1
|k2〉i−1
|k3〉i−1 RotByte
l SubByte
RotByte†
RC |k0〉i
|k1〉i
|k2〉i
|k3〉i
(a) AES-128 in-place key expansion step producing the i-th round key.
|k0〉i−1
|k1〉i−1
|k2〉i−1
|k3〉i−1
|k4〉i−1
|k5〉i−1
|k6〉i−1
|k7〉i−1 RotByte
l SubByte
RotByte†
RC
SubByte
|k0〉i
|k1〉i
|k2〉i
|k3〉i
|k4〉i
|k5〉i
|k6〉i
|k7〉i
(b) AES-256 in-place key expansion step producing the i-th set of 8 round key words.
Fig. 1: In-place AES key expansion for AES-128 and AES-256, deriving the ith
set of Nk round key works from the (i− 1)th. AES-192 is identical to AES-128,
but with 6 key words. Each |kj〉i represents the jth word of |k〉i. SubByte takes
the input state on the top wire, and returns the output on the bottom wire, while
l SubByte takes inputs on the bottom wire, and returns outputs on the top.
Dashed lines indicate wires that are not used in the l SubByte operation. RC is
the round constant addition, implemented by applying X gates as appropriate.
Remark 3. In addition to improving the S-box circuit over [21], Langenberg et
al. [31, §4] demonstrate significant savings by reducing the number of qubits and
the depth of key expansion. This is achieved by an improved scheduling of key
expansion during AES encryption, namely by computing round key words only at
the time they are required and un-computing them early. While their method is
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based on the one in [21] using auxiliary qubits for the round keys, our approach
works completely in place and reduces width and depth at the same time.
Round, FinalRound and full AES. To encrypt a message block using AES-
128 (resp. -192, -256), we initially XOR the input message with the first 4 words of
the key, and then execute 10 (resp. 12, 14) rounds consisting of ByteSub, ShiftRow,
MixColumn (except in the final round) and AddRoundKey. The quantum circuits
for AES we propose follow the same blueprint with the exception that key
expansion is interleaved with the algorithm in such a way that the operations
KElj only produce the key words that are immediately required.
The resulting circuits are shown in Figure 2. For formatting reasons, we omit
the repeating round pattern and AES-256, and only represent a subset of the full
set of qubits used. In AES-128, each round is identical until round 9. In AES-192
rounds 5, 8 and 11 use the same KE call and order as round 2; rounds 6 and
9 do as round 3; rounds 7 and 10 do as round 4. In AES-256, rounds 4, 6, 8,
10, 12 (resp. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13) use the same KE call and order as round 2 (resp.
3). Cost estimates for the resulting AES encryption circuits are in Table 3. In
contrast to [21] and [31], we aim to reduce circuit depth, hence un-computing of
rounds is delayed until the output ciphertext is produced. For easier testability
and modularity, the Round circuit is divided into two parts: a ForwardRound
operator that computes the output state but does not clean auxiliary qubits, and
its adjoint. For unit-testing Round in isolation, we compose ForwardRound with
its adjoint operator. For testing AES, we first run all ForwardRound instances
without auxiliary qubit cleaning, resulting in a similar ForwardAES operator,
copy out the ciphertext, and then undo the ForwardAES operation.
Table 3 presents results for the AES circuit for both versions of MixColumn,
the in-place implementation using a PLU decomposition as well as Maximov’s
out-of-place, but lower depth circuit. We use both because each has advantages for
different applications. The full depth corresponds to GD as in §3.4 and §2.3, while
width corresponds to GW . While for AES-128 and AES-192, GDGW is smaller for
the in-place implementation, G2DGW is smaller for Maximov’s circuit. Hence, §2.3
indicates Maximov’s circuit gives a lower DW -cost under a depth restriction. If
there is no depth restriction, the in-place design has a lower DW -cost.
operation MC #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -depth full depth width
AES-128 IP 291150 83116 54400 13600 120 2827 1785
AES-192 IP 328612 93160 60928 15232 120 2987 2105
AES-256 IP 402878 114778 75072 18768 126 3353 2425
AES-128 M 293730 83236 54400 13600 120 2094 2937
AES-192 M 331752 93280 60928 15232 120 1879 3513
AES-256 M 406288 114318 75072 18768 126 1955 4089
Table 3: Circuit cost estimates for the AES operator, using the [11] S-box and
for MixColumn design (“MC”) either in-place (“IP”) or Maximov’s [34] (“M”).
The apparently inconsistent T -depth is discussed under T -depth.
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T -depth. Every round of AES (as implemented in Figure 2) computes at least
one layer of S-boxes as part of ByteSub, which must later be uncomputed. We
would thus expect the T -depth of n rounds of AES to be 2n times the T -depth
of the S-box. Instead, Table 3 shows smaller depths. We find this effect when
using either the AND circuit or the unit-testable CCNOT implementation. To
test if this is a bug, we used a placeholder S-box circuit which has an arbitrary
T -depth d and which the compiler cannot parallelize. This “dummy“ AES design
had the expected T -depth of 2n · d. Thus we believe the Q# compiler found
non-trivial parallelization between components of the S-box and the surrounding
circuit. This provides a strong case for full explicit implementations of quantum
cryptanalytic algorithms in Q# or other languages that allow automatic resource
estimates and optimizations; in our case the T -depth of AES-256 is 25% less than
naively expected. Unfortunately, Q# cannot yet generate full circuit diagrams,
so we do not know exactly where the parallelization takes place9.
5 A quantum circuit for LowMC
LowMC [1,2] is a family of block ciphers aiming for low multiplicative complexity
circuits. Originally designed to reduce the high cost of binary multiplication in
the MPC and FHE scenarios, it has been adopted as a fundamental component
by the Picnic signature scheme (see [14] and [56]) proposed for standardization
as part of the NIST process for standardizing post-quantum cryptography.
To achieve low multiplicative complexity, LowMC uses an S-box layer of
AND-depth 1, which contains a user-defined number of parallel 3-bit S-box
computations. In general, any instantiation of LowMC comprises a specific
number of rounds. Each round calls an S-box layer, an affine transformation, and
a round key addition. Key-scheduling can either be precomputed or computed
on the fly. In this work, we study the original LowMC design. This results in a
sub-optimal circuit, which can clearly be improved by porting the more recent
version from [17] instead. Even for the original LowMC, our work shows that the
overhead from the cost of the Grover oracle is very small, in particular under the
T -depth metric. Since LowMC could be standardized as a component of Picnic,
we deem it appropriate to point out the differences in Grover oracle cost between
different block ciphers and that generalization from AES requires caution.
In this section we describe our Q# implementation of the LowMC instances
used as part of Picnic. In particular, Picnic proposes three parameter sets, with
(key size,block size, rounds) ∈ {(128, 128, 20), (192, 192, 30), (256, 256, 38)}, all
with 10 parallel S-boxes per substitution layer.
S-box and S-boxLayer. The LowMC S-box can be naturally implemented
using Toffoli (CCNOT) gates. In particular, a simple in-place implementation
with depth 5 (T -depth 3) is shown in Figure 3, alongside a T -depth 1 out-of-place
circuit, both of which were produced manually. Costs for both circuits can be
9 https://github.com/microsoft/qsharp-runtime/issues/31, visited 2019-09-03.
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found in Table 4. We use the CCNOT implementation with no measurements
from [44]. For LowMC inside of Picnic, the full S-boxLayer consists of 10 parallel
S-boxes run on the 30 low order bits of the state.
|a〉
|b〉
|c〉
|a + bc〉
|a + b + ac〉
|a + b + c + ab〉
(a) LowMC in-place S-box.
|a〉
|b〉
|c〉
|0〉
|0〉
|0〉
|x〉
|y〉
|z〉
|a〉
|b〉
|c〉
|0〉
|0〉
|0〉
|x + a + bc〉
|y + a + b + ac〉
|z + a + b + c + ab〉
(b) LowMC T -depth 1 S-box.
Fig. 3: Alternative quantum circuit designs for the LowMC S-box. The in-place
design requires auxiliary qubits as part of the concrete CCNOT implementation.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -depth full depth width
In-place S-box 50 6 21 0 3 23 7
Shallow S-box 60 6 21 0 1 11 13
Table 4: Cost estimates for a single LowMC S-box circuit, following the two
designs proposed in Figure 3. We note that the circuit size may seem different at
first sight due to Figure 3 not displaying the concrete CCNOT implementation.
LinearLayer, ConstantAddition and AffineLayer. AffineLayer is an affine
transformation applied to the state at every round. It consists of a matrix multi-
plication (LinearLayer) and the addition of a constant vector (ConstantAddition).
Both matrix and vector are different for every round and are predefined constants
that are populated pseudo-randomly. ConstantAddition is implemented by ap-
plying X gates for entries of the vector equal to 1. In Picnic, for every round and
every parameter set, all LinearLayer matrices are invertible (due to LowMC’s
specification requirements), and hence we use a PLU decomposition for matrix
multiplication (§3.3). Cost estimates for the first round affine transformation in
LowMC as used in Picnic are in Table 5.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -depth full depth width
AffineLayer L1 R1 8093 60 0 0 0 2365 128
AffineLayer L3 R1 18080 90 0 0 0 5301 192
AffineLayer L5 R1 32714 137 0 0 0 8603 256
Table 5: Costs for in-place circuits implementing the first round (R1) AffineLayer
transformation for the three instantiations of LowMC used in Picnic.
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KeyExpansion and KeyAddition. To generate the round keys rki, in each
round i the LowMC key k is multiplied by a different key derivation pseudo-
random matrix KMi. For Picnic, each KMi is invertible, so we compute rki
from rki−1 as rki = KMi · KM−1i−1 · rki−1. We compute this in-place using a
PLU decomposition of KMi · KM−1i−1. This saves matrix multiplications and
qubits compared to computing rki directly. We call this operation KeyExpansion.
KeyAddition is equivalent to AddRoundKey in AES, and is implemented the
same way. Cost estimates for the first round key expansion in LowMC as used in
Picnic can be found in Table 6.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -depth full depth width
KeyExpansion L1 R1 8104 0 0 0 0 2438 128
KeyExpansion L3 R1 18242 0 0 0 0 4896 192
KeyExpansion L5 R1 32525 0 0 0 0 9358 256
Table 6: Costs for in-place circuits implementing the first round (R1) KeyExpan-
sion operation for the three instantiations of LowMC used in Picnic.
Round and LowMC. The LowMC round sequentially applies S-boxLayer,
AffineLayer and KeyAddition to the state. Our implementation also runs Key-
Expansion before AffineLayer. For a full LowMC encryption, we first add the
LowMC key k to the message to produce the initial state, then run the specified
number of rounds on it. Costs of the resulting encryption circuit are in Table 7.
operation #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -depth full depth width
LowMC L1 689944 4932 8400 0 40 98699 991
LowMC L3 2271870 9398 12600 0 60 319317 1483
LowMC L5 5070324 14274 15960 0 76 693471 1915
Table 7: Costs for the full encryption circuit for LowMC as used in Picnic.
6 Grover oracles and key search resource estimates
Equipped with Q# implementations of the AES and LowMC encryption circuits,
this section describes the implementation of full Grover oracles for both block
ciphers. Eventually, based on the cost estimates obtained automatically from
these Q# Grover oracles, we provide quantum resource estimates for full key
search attacks via Grover’s algorithm. Beyond comparing to previous work, our
emphasis is on evaluating algorithms that respect a total depth limit, for which
we consider NIST’s values for MAXDEPTH from [37]. This means we must parallelize.
We use inner parallelization via splitting up the search space, see §2.3.
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6.1 Grover oracles
As discussed in §2.2 and §2.3, we must determine the parameter r, the number of
known plaintext-ciphertext pairs that are required for a successful key-recovery
attack. The Grover oracle encrypts r plaintext blocks under the same candidate
key and computes a Boolean value that encodes whether all r resulting ciphertext
blocks match the given classical results. A circuit for the block cipher allows
us to build an oracle for any r by simply fanning out the key qubits to the r
instances and running the r block cipher circuits in parallel. Then a comparison
operation with the classical ciphertexts conditionally flips the result qubit and
the r encryptions are un-computed. Figure 4 shows the construction for AES
and r = 2, using the ForwardAES operation from §4.
|k〉0
|m1〉
|m2〉
|−〉
|0〉
|0〉
|0〉
FwAES
FwAES
FwAES†
FwAES†
|0〉
|0〉
|0〉
|k〉0
|m1〉
|m2〉
|−〉
Fig. 4: Grover oracle construction from AES using two message-ciphertext pairs.
FwAES represents the ForwardAES operator described in §4. The middle operator
“=” compares the output of AES with the provided ciphertexts and flips the
target qubit if they are equal.
The required number of plaintext-ciphertext blocks. The explicit com-
putation of the probabilities in Equation (1) shows that using r = 2 (resp. 2,
3) for AES-128 (resp. -192, -256) guarantees a unique key with overwhelming
probability. The probabilities that there are no spurious keys are 1− , where
 < 2−128, 2−64, and 2−128, respectively. Grassl et al. [21, § 3.1] used r = 3, r = 4
and r = 5, respectively. Hence, these values are too large and the Grover oracle
can work correctly with fewer full AES evaluations.
If one is content with a success probability lower than 1, it suffices to use
r = dk/ne blocks of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. In this case, it is enough to use
r = 1, 2, and 3 for AES-128, -192, -256, respectively. Langenberg et al. [31] also
propose these values. As an example, if we use r = 1 for AES-128, the probability
of not having spurious keys is 1/e ≈ 0.368, which could be a high enough chance
for a successful attack in certain scenarios, e.g., when there is a strict limit on
the width of the attack circuit. Furthermore, when a large number of parallel
machines are used in an instance of the attack, as discussed in §2.3, even the
value r = 1 can be enough in order to guarantee with high probability that the
relevant subset of the key space contains the correct key as a unique solution.
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The LowMC parameter sets we consider here all have k = n. Therefore, r = 2
plaintext-ciphertext pairs are enough for all three sets (k ∈ {128, 192, 256}).
Then, the probability that the key is unique is 1 − , where  < 2−k, i.e. this
probability is negligibly close to 1. With high parallelization, r = 1 is sufficient
for a success probability very close to 1.
Grover oracle cost for AES. Table 8 shows the resources needed for the
full AES Grover oracle for the relevant values of r ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Even without
parallelization, more than 2 pairs are never required for AES-128 and AES-192.
The same holds for 4 or more pairs for AES-256.
Grover oracle cost for LowMC. The resources for our implementation of
the full LowMC Grover oracle for the relevant values of r ∈ {1, 2} are shown in
Table 9. No setting needs more than r = 2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
operation MC r #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -depth full depth width
AES-128 IP 1 292313 84428 54908 13727 121 2816 1665
AES-192 IP 1 329697 94316 61436 15359 120 2978 1985
AES-256 IP 1 404139 116286 75580 18895 126 3353 2305
AES-128 IP 2 585051 169184 109820 27455 121 2815 3329
AES-192 IP 2 659727 188520 122876 30719 120 2981 3969
AES-256 IP 2 808071 231124 151164 37791 126 3356 4609
AES-256 IP 3 1212905 347766 226748 56687 126 3347 6913
AES-128 M 1 294863 84488 54908 13727 121 2086 2817
AES-192 M 1 332665 94092 61436 15359 120 1879 3393
AES-256 M 1 407667 116062 75580 18895 126 1951 3969
AES-128 M 2 589643 168288 109820 27455 121 2096 5633
AES-192 M 2 665899 188544 122876 30719 120 1890 6785
AES-256 M 2 815645 231712 151164 37791 126 1952 7937
AES-256 M 3 1223087 346290 226748 56687 126 1956 11905
Table 8: Costs for the AES Grover oracle operator for r = 1, 2 and 3 plaintext-
ciphertext pairs. “MC” is the MixColumn design, either in-place (“IP”) or
Maximov’s [34] (“M”).
6.2 Cost estimates for block cipher key search
Using the cost estimates for the AES and LowMC Grover oracles from §6.1, this
section provides cost estimates for full key search attacks on both block ciphers.
For the sake of a direct comparison to the previous results in [21] and [31], we
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operation r #CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -depth full depth width
LowMC L1 1 690961 5917 8908 191 41 98709 1585
LowMC L3 1 2273397 10881 13364 286 61 319323 2377
LowMC L5 1 5072343 16209 16980 372 77 693477 3049
LowMC L1 2 1382143 11774 17820 362 41 98707 3169
LowMC L3 2 4547191 21783 26732 576 61 319329 4753
LowMC L5 2 10145281 32567 33964 783 77 693483 6097
Table 9: Cost estimates for the LowMC Grover oracle operator for r = 1 and 2
plaintext-ciphertext pairs. LowMC parameter sets are as used in Picnic.
first ignore any limit on the depth and present the same setting as in these works.
Then, we provide cost estimates with imposed depth limits and the consequential
parallelization requirements.
Comparison to previous work. Table 10 shows cost estimates for a full run
of Grover’s algorithm when using
⌊
pi
4 2
k/2
⌋
iterations of the AES Grover operator
without parallelization. We only take into account the costs imposed by the
oracle operator Uf (in the notation of §2.1) and ignore the costs of the operator
2 |ψ〉〈ψ| − I. If the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs ensures a unique key, this
number of operations maximizes the success probability psucc to be negligibly
close to 1. For smaller values of r such as those proposed in [31], the success
probability is given by the probability that the key is unique.
The G-cost is the total number of gates, which is the sum of the first three
columns in the table, corresponding to the numbers of 1-qubit Clifford and CNOT
gates, T gates and measurements. Table 10 shows that the G-cost is always better
in our work when comparing values for the same AES instance and the same
value for r. The same holds for the DW -cost as we increase the width by factors
less than 4 and simultaneously reduce the depth by more than that.
Table 11 shows cost estimates for LowMC in the same setting. Despite
LowMC’s lower multiplicative complexity and a relatively lower number of T
gates, the large number of CNOT gates leads to overall higher G-cost and
DW -cost than AES, as we count all gates.
Cost estimates under a depth limit. Tables 13a and 13b show cost estimates
for running Grover’s algorithm against AES and LowMC under a given depth limit.
This restriction is proposed in the NIST call for proposals for standardization
of post-quantum cryptography [37]. We use the notation and example values
for MAXDEPTH from the call. Imposing a depth limit forces the parallelization of
Grover’s algorithm, which we assume uses inner parallelization, see §2.3.
The values in the table follow §3.4. Given cost estimates GG, GD and GW for
the oracle circuit, we determine the maximal number of Grover iterations that
can be carried out within the MAXDEPTH limit. Then the required number S of
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Grassl et al. [21]
scheme r #Clifford #T #M T -depth full depth width G-cost DW -cost ps
AES-128 3 1.55 · 286 1.19 · 286 0 1.06 · 280 1.16 · 281 2 953 1.37 · 287 1.67 · 292 1
AES-192 4 1.17 · 2119 1.81 · 2118 0 1.21 · 2112 1.33 · 2113 4 449 1.04 · 2120 1.44 · 2125 1
AES-256 5 1.83 · 2151 1.41 · 2151 0 1.44 · 2144 1.57 · 2145 6 681 1.62 · 2152 1.28 · 2158 1
extrapolation of Grassl et al. [21] to lower r
AES-128 1 1.03 · 285 1.59 · 284 0 1.06 · 280 1.16 · 281 984 1.83 · 285 1.11 · 291 1/e
AES-192 2 1.17 · 2118 1.81 · 2117 0 1.21 · 2112 1.33 · 2113 2 224 1.04 · 2119 1.44 · 2124 1
AES-256 2 1.46 · 2150 1.13 · 2150 0 1.44 · 2144 1.57 · 2145 2 672 1.30 · 2151 1.02 · 2157 1/e
Langenberg et al. [31]
AES-128 1 1.46 · 282 1.47 · 281 0 1.44 · 277 1.39 · 279 865 1.10 · 283 1.17 · 289 1/e
AES-192 2 1.71 · 2115 1.68 · 2114 0 1.26 · 2109 1.23 · 2111 1 793 1.27 · 2116 1.08 · 2122 1
AES-256 2 1.03 · 2148 1.02 · 2147 0 1.66 · 2141 1.61 · 2143 2 465 1.54 · 2148 1.94 · 2154 1/e
this work (with “in-place” MixColumn)
AES-128 1 1.13 · 282 1.32 · 279 1.32 · 277 1.48 · 270 1.08 · 275 1665 1.33 · 282 1.76 · 285 1/e
AES-128 2 1.13 · 283 1.32 · 280 1.32 · 278 1.48 · 270 1.08 · 275 3329 1.34 · 283 1.75 · 286 1
AES-192 2 1.27 · 2115 1.47 · 2112 1.47 · 2110 1.47 · 2102 1.14 · 2107 3969 1.50 · 2115 1.11 · 2119 1
AES-256 2 1.56 · 2147 1.81 · 2144 1.81 · 2142 1.55 · 2134 1.29 · 2139 4609 1.84 · 2147 1.45 · 2151 1/e
AES-256 3 1.17 · 2148 1.36 · 2145 1.36 · 2143 1.55 · 2134 1.28 · 2139 6913 1.38 · 2148 1.08 · 2152 1
this work (with “in-place” MixColumn), using Grassl et al. [21] values for r
AES-128 3 1.69 · 283 1.97 · 280 1.97 · 278 1.48 · 270 1.09 · 275 4993 1.00 · 284 1.32 · 287 1
AES-192 4 1.27 · 2116 1.47 · 2113 1.47 · 2111 1.47 · 2102 1.15 · 2107 7937 1.50 · 2116 1.11 · 2120 1
AES-256 5 1.95 · 2148 1.13 · 2146 1.13 · 2144 1.55 · 2134 1.28 · 2139 11521 1.15 · 2149 1.81 · 2152 1
Table 10: Comparison of cost estimates for Grover’s algorithm with
⌊
pi
4 2
k/2
⌋
AES
oracle iterations for attacks with high success probability, disregarding MAXDEPTH.
CNOT and 1-qubit Clifford gate counts are added to allow easier comparison to
the previous work from [21,31], who report both kinds of gates under “Clifford”.
[31] uses the S-box design from [10]. “IP MC” (resp. “M’s MC”) means the oracle
uses an in-place (resp. Maximov’s [34]) MixColumn design. The circuit sizes
for AES-128 (resp. -192, -256) in the second block have been extrapolated from
Grassl et al. by multiplying gate counts and circuit width by 1/3 (resp. 1/2, 2/5),
while keeping depth values intact. ps reports the approximate success probability.
scheme r # CNOT #1qCliff #T #M T -depth full depth width G-cost DW -cost ps
LowMC L1 1 1.04 · 283 1.13 · 276 1.71 · 276 1.17 · 271 1.01 · 269 1.18 · 280 1585 1.06 · 283 1.83 · 290 1/e
LowMC L3 1 1.70 · 2116 1.04 · 2109 1.28 · 2109 1.75 · 2103 1.50 · 2101 1.91 · 2113 2377 1.72 · 2116 1.11 · 2125 1/e
LowMC L5 1 1.90 · 2149 1.55 · 2141 1.63 · 2141 1.14 · 2136 1.89 · 2133 1.04 · 2147 3049 1.91 · 2149 1.55 · 2158 1/e
LowMC L1 2 1.04 · 284 1.13 · 277 1.71 · 277 1.11 · 272 1.01 · 269 1.18 · 280 3169 1.06 · 284 1.83 · 291 1
LowMC L3 2 1.70 · 2117 1.04 · 2110 1.28 · 2110 1.77 · 2104 1.50 · 2101 1.91 · 2113 4753 1.72 · 2117 1.11 · 2126 1
LowMC L5 2 1.90 · 2150 1.56 · 2142 1.63 · 2142 1.20 · 2137 1.89 · 2133 1.04 · 2147 6097 1.91 · 2150 1.55 · 2159 1
Table 11: Cost estimates for Grover’s algorithm with
⌊
pi
4 2
k/2
⌋
LowMC oracle
iterations for attacks with high success probability, without a depth restriction.
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parallel instances is computed via Equation (7) and the G-cost and DW -cost
follow from Equations (8) and (9). The number r of plaintext-ciphertext pairs is
the minimal value such that the probability SKP for having spurious keys in the
subset of the key space that holds the target key is less than 2−20.
The impact of imposing a depth limit on the key search algorithm can directly
be seen by comparing, for example Table 13a with Table 10 in the case of AES.
Key search against AES-128 without depth limit has a G-cost of 1.34 · 283 gates
and a DW -cost of 1.75 · 286 qubit-cycles. Now, setting MAXDEPTH = 240 increases
both the G-cost and the DW -cost by a factor of roughly 234 to 1.07 · 2117 gates
and 1.76 · 2120 qubit-cycles. For MAXDEPTH = 264, the increase is by a factor of
roughly 210. We note that for MAXDEPTH = 296, key search on AES-128 does not
require any parallelization.
Implications for post-quantum security categories. The security strength
categories 1, 3 and 5 in the NIST call for proposals [37] are defined by the
resources needed for key search on AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256, respectively.
For a cryptographic scheme to satisfy the security requirement at a given level,
the best known attack must take at least as many resources as key search against
the corresponding AES instance.
As guidance, NIST provides a table with gate cost estimates via a formula
depending on the depth bound MAXDEPTH. This formula is deduced as follows:
assume that non-parallel Grover search requires a depth of D = x · MAXDEPTH for
some x ≥ 1 and the circuit has G gates. Then, about x2 machines are needed
that each run for a fraction 1/x of the time and use roughly G/x gates in order
for the quantum attack to fit within the depth budget given by MAXDEPTH while
attaining the same attack success probability. Hence, the total gate count for
a parallelized Grover search is roughly (G/x) · x2 = G ·D/MAXDEPTH. The cost
formula reported in the NIST table (also provided in Table 12 for reference) is
deduced by using the values for G-cost and depth D from Grassl et al. [21].
The above formula does not take into account that parallelization often allows
us to reduce the number of required plaintext-ciphertext pairs, resulting in a
G-cost reduction for search in each parallel Grover instance by a factor larger
than x. Note also that [37, Footnote 5] mentions that using the formula for very
small values of x (very large values of MAXDEPTH such that D/MAXDEPTH < 1,
where no parallelization is required) underestimates the quantum security of AES.
This is the case for AES-128 with MAXDEPTH = 296.
In Table 12, we compare NIST’s numbers with our gate counts for parallel
Grover search. Our results for each specific setting incorporate the reduction
of plaintext-ciphertext pairs through parallelization, provide the correct cost if
parallelization is not necessary and use improved circuit designs. The table shows
that for most situations, AES is less quantum secure than the NIST estimates
predict. For each category, we provide a very rough approximation formula that
could be used to replace NIST’s formula. We observe a consistent reduction in
G-cost for quantum key search by 11-13 bits.
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Since NIST clearly defines its security categories 1, 3 and 5 based on the
computational resources required for key search on AES, the explicit gate counts
should be lowered to account for the best known attack. This would mean that
it is now easier for submitters to claim equivalent security, with the exception of
category 1 with MAXDEPTH = 296. A possible consequence of our work is that some
of the NIST submissions might profit from slightly tweaking certain parameter
sets to allow more efficient implementations, while at the same time satisfying
the (now weaker) requirements for their intended security category.
Remark 4. The G-cost results in Table 13b show that key recovery against the
LowMC instances we implemented requires at least as many gates as key recovery
against AES with the same key size. If NIST replaces its explicit gate cost
estimates for AES with the ones in this work, these LowMC instances meet the
post-quantum security requirements as defined in the NIST call [37]. On the
other hand, the same results show that they do not meet the explicit gate count
requirements for the original NIST security categories. For example, LowMC L1
can be broken with an attack having G-cost 1.25 · 2123 when MAXDEPTH = 240,
while the original bound in category 1 requires a scheme to not be broken by an
attack using less than 2130 gates. In all settings considered here, a LowMC key
can be found with a slightly smaller G-cost than NIST’s original estimates for
AES, again with the exception when no parallelization is needed. The margin
is relatively small. We cannot finalize conclusions about the relative security of
LowMC and AES until quantum circuits for LowMC are optimized as much as
the ones for AES.
NIST Security G-cost for MAXDEPTH (log2)
Category source 240 264 296 approximation
1 AES-128
[37] 130.0 106.0 74.0 2170/MAXDEPTH
this work 117.1 93.1 ∗83.4 ≈ 2157/MAXDEPTH
3 AES-192
[37] 193.0 169.0 137.0 2233/MAXDEPTH
this work 181.1 157.1 126.1 ≈ 2221/MAXDEPTH
5 AES-256
[37] 258.0 234.0 202.0 2298/MAXDEPTH
this work 245.5 221.5 190.5 ≈ 2285/MAXDEPTH
Table 12: Comparison of our cost estimate results with NIST’s approximations
based on Grassl et al. [21]. The approximation column displays NIST’s formula
from [37] and a rough approximation to replace the NIST formula based on our
results. Under MAXDEPTH = 296, AES-128 is a special case as the attack does not
require any parallelization and the approximation underestimates its cost.
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scheme MD r S log2 (SKP) D W G-cost DW -cost
AES-128 240 1 1.28 · 269 −69.36 1.00 · 240 1.76 · 280 1.07 · 2117 1.76 · 2120
AES-192 240 1 1.04 · 2133 −69.05 1.00 · 240 1.72 · 2144 1.09 · 2181 1.72 · 2184
AES-256 240 1 1.12 · 2197 −69.16 1.00 · 240 1.08 · 2209 1.39 · 2245 1.08 · 2249
AES-128 264 1 1.28 · 221 −21.36 1.00 · 264 1.76 · 232 1.07 · 293 1.76 · 296
AES-192 264 1 1.04 · 285 −21.05 1.00 · 264 1.72 · 296 1.09 · 2157 1.72 · 2160
AES-256 264 1 1.12 · 2149 −21.16 1.00 · 264 1.08 · 2161 1.39 · 2221 1.08 · 2225
AES-128* 296 2 1.00 · 20 −∞ 1.08 · 275 1.63 · 211 1.34 · 283 1.75 · 286
AES-192 296 2 1.05 · 221 −∞ 1.00 · 296 1.74 · 233 1.09 · 2126 1.74 · 2129
AES-256 296 2 1.12 · 285 −85.16 1.00 · 296 1.09 · 298 1.39 · 2190 1.09 · 2194
(a) Grover oracle for AES.
scheme MD r S log2 (SKP) D W G-cost DW -cost
LowMC L1 240 1 1.40 · 280 −80.48 1.00 · 240 1.08 · 291 1.25 · 2123 1.08 · 2131
LowMC L3 240 1 1.83 · 2147 −147.87 1.00 · 240 1.06 · 2159 1.65 · 2190 1.06 · 2199
LowMC L5 240 1 1.08 · 2214 −214.11 1.00 · 240 1.61 · 2225 1.99 · 2256 1.61 · 2265
LowMC L1 264 1 1.40 · 232 −32.48 1.00 · 264 1.08 · 243 1.25 · 299 1.08 · 2107
LowMC L3 264 1 1.83 · 299 −99.87 1.00 · 264 1.06 · 2111 1.65 · 2166 1.06 · 2175
LowMC L5 264 1 1.08 · 2166 −166.11 1.00 · 264 1.61 · 2177 1.99 · 2232 1.61 · 2241
LowMC L1 296 2 1.00 · 20 −∞ 1.18 · 280 1.55 · 211 1.06 · 284 1.83 · 291
LowMC L3 296 1 1.83 · 235 −35.87 1.00 · 296 1.06 · 247 1.65 · 2134 1.06 · 2143
LowMC L5 296 1 1.08 · 2102 −102.11 1.00 · 296 1.61 · 2113 1.99 · 2200 1.61 · 2209
(b) Grover oracle for LowMC
Table 13: Cost estimates for parallel Grover key search against block ciphers under
a depth limit MAXDEPTH with inner parallelization (see §2.3). MD is MAXDEPTH, r
is the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs used in the Grover oracle, S is the
number of subsets into which the key space is divided, SKP is the probability
that spurious keys are present in the subset holding the target key, W is the
qubit width of the full circuit and D the full depth. Each of the S candidate
keys measured from the Grover search are classically checked against plaintext-
ciphertext pairs. AES-128, -192, and -256 need 2, 2, and 3 such pairs, respectively,
while LowMC needs 2 pairs for all sizes.
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7 Future work
This work’s main focus is on exploring the setting proposed by NIST where
quantum attacks are limited by a total bound on the depth of quantum circuits.
Previous works [21,3,31] aim to minimize cost under a tradeoff between circuit
depth and a limit on the total number of qubits needed, say a hypothetical
bound MAXDEPTH. Depth limits are not discussed when choosing a Grover strategy.
Since it is somewhat unclear what exact characteristics and features a future
scalable quantum hardware might have, quantum circuit and Grover strategy
optimization with the goal of minimizing different cost metrics under different
constraints than MAXDEPTH could be an interesting avenue for future research.
We have studied key search problems for a single target. In classical crypt-
analysis, multi-target attacks have to be taken into account for assessing the
security of cryptographic systems. We leave the exploration of estimating the cost
of quantum multi-target attacks, for example using the algorithm by Banegas
and Bernstein [6] under MAXDEPTH (or alternative regimes), as future work.
Further, implementing quantum circuits for cryptanalysis in Q# or another
quantum programming language for concrete cost estimation is worthwhile
to increase confidence in the security of proposed post-quantum schemes. For
example, quantum lattice sieving and enumeration appear to be prime candidates.
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